The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.12.2

“A demonstration (4:757c) is a syllogism that is productive of scientific knowledge, i.e., knowledge that is true and certain because based on the cause [§35] that makes the conclusion be as it is.  Effectively a demonstration is had whenever a statement is given together with the reason (or cause, or explanation) for its truth, that is, whenever the question “why” is answered.  Because there are different senses of “why” there are different kinds of demonstration.  Since the reason “why” is expressed by the middle term [§5.6] of the demonstrative syllogism, it can be equivalently said that the types of demonstration correspond to the condition of the middle term that links the subject and predicate of a scientific conclusion.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §12.  DEMONSTRATION  //  [paragraph] 2  //   [pages] 35 and 36)

 

Obiter Dicta:  Many of us today equate science with current modern science.  Current modern science limits its enquiries to those things which deal with matter (and the various forms in which matter appears, such as energy) and motion (the various changes undergone by matter).  Further modern science limits its analysis to the external causes of change.  As such, modern science has little or no interest in determining the essences or natures of the things in which it is interested.  These limitations are not meant to belittle modern science.  In addressing issues of matter and motion and external causality, modern science does good work.

However, the word science, derived from the Latin scientia, originally and continues to refer to the attempt to discover the essence and nature of things.  Because of this interest, this more wholesome notion of science refers to the attempt to discover and display and understand the essences/natures of the things which it investigates.  In order to understand essences, this science seeks to uncover and display the internal causes which constitute those essences/natures.  To this end, this science (as does modern science) makes use of scientific deduction; the certain correlation of a subject with a predicate by means of the proper identification and use of the middle term which necessarily relates and uncovers the relationship of the given subject to the given predicate, leading to a certain conclusion.  For example, if it is known that all mammals have backbones, and if it is known that a porpoise is a mammal, it then necessarily follows that porpoises have backbones.  This conclusion, i.e. that porpoises have backbones, is necessarily true even if the investigator never had the opportunity to study actual examples of porpoises to ascertain they were in fact vertebrates.  All the investigator needs to know for certain is that porpoises are mammals and that mammals are vertebrates.  “Mammal”, here, functions as the middle term which necessarily connects the major and minor terms of vertebrate (backboned) and porpoises, and thus necessarily leads to the conclusion that porpoises have backbones (are vertebrates).

Modern science, having relinquished the attempt to discover and display the essences and natures of things; relegating itself to understandings of the various changes which forms of matter undergo, more and more has come to accept the statistical validity of various forms of inductive reasoning; i.e. tentative conclusions reached by the accumulation of examples of changes and their causes.  The problem with inductive reasoning is that the science which depends on it, can no more reach certain conclusions than it can uncover essences.  The use of inductive reasoning is; however, valuable in reaching new conclusions by the means of attention to new phenomena and the accumulation of additional observational examples.  This is the strength of modern science; it uncovers new understandings of the changes which things undergo.  However, in order to do so, it forever silences itself in regard to the existence of the essence/nature of the things it investigates as a result of limiting itself to external causality.  This limitation and focus of modern science is good and helpful, in terms of those technological applications which benefit the material condition of persons and other living things, and in the technological construction of those environments which contribute to these material benefits.  However, as modern science is silent in the area of essences/natures, it is necessarily silent as well in those many and important immaterial spiritual areas of human nature and action.  This silence limits the value modern science has for understanding key elements of the relational, social, political, emotional, mental aspects of human existence.

It is in these more immaterial aspects of human existence that the original notion of science is more valuable.  When speaking of hate and love and insight and creativity and community and soul and many more beside, the scientific analysis of the internal causes constituting the essence/nature of the things this science seeks to discover and display; it is this science which is more wholesome and valuable.

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.12.1

“When reasoning, the third act of the mind, is considered from the viewpoint of material logic, it is seen as generating various types of argumentation with distinctive probative force depending on their matter or content.  Argumentation is apodictic when the matter involved is necessary, i.e., the various terms of the antecedent cannot be related otherwise than they are; when this obtains with the deductive process the result is a demonstration.  When the matter is only contingent or probable the argumentation is said to be dialectical; this is discussed in the branch of logic known as dialectics (4:843a).  When the matter is such that it involves the emotions, but in a hidden way, the argumentation is rhetorical; its study pertains to rhetoric (12:458a).  Finally, when open appeal is made to the emotions, the argumentation may be called poetic; that is the subject of Aristotle’s Poetics [§58.2].  Thus argumentation can express a reasoning process in a variety of ways, from the strictest scientific reasoning (the focus of interest in what follows) to the subtle intimations of poetry; it embraces inductive and deductive processes, and often combines both.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §12.  DEMONSTRATION  //  [paragraph] 1  //   [page] 35)

 

Obiter Dicta:  Logic uses words/speech to discover and display truth is speech.  It is interesting that all of the following use words/speech in an attempt to discover and display truth; deductive logic, inductive logic, dialectic and dialogue, rhetoric, and poetics (the type of speech used in poetry, and dramas).  Poetics, primarily, uses speech to accomplish an emotional catharsis/cleansing/healing/maturation.  In order to do so, poetics needs to attempt to discover and display relational and social and emotional truths.  Rhetoric, which is a tool used a great deal in politics, is the use of refined speech (and the use of other means) for the purpose of persuasion.  In order to persuade, there are times in which rhetoric does seek to also discover and display truth.  However, unlike philosophy which seeks to discover and display truth for truth’s own sake, rhetoric will use the discovery and display of truth for another purpose; persuasion.

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.11.6

“Except for one who studies a science, knowledge of principles proper to that science in not indispensable.  Nor is there need to know such principles before taking up the science, for it is understood that the instructor begins by laying down these principles.  Whatever the discipline in which one engages, however, the possession of axioms or common principles is a prerequisite.  Proper principles are already a part, initial though it be, of a science or particular treatise, whereas axioms are completely prior to any science.  Thus Boethius [A.D. 477 to 526] has formulated the classical distinction between immediate propositions that are such for specialists alone (quoad sapientes tantum) and immediate propositions that are such for all (quoad omnes).  These are further divided into immediate propositions that are readily seen by us (quoad nos), and those not recognized as such (quoad ad tantum) that require a posteriori demonstration, such as the proposition “God exists.”  Thus, not all immediate propositions are principles, for the criterion of a principle is that it be better known to us and even to all in the case of first principles.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §11.  FIRST PRINCIPLES  //  [paragraph] 6  //   [pages] 34 and 35)

 

Obiter Dicta:  That God exists is not self-evident.  Similarly, the proposition “God exists” is not a self-evident proposition.  The truth that God exists and the truth of the proposition “God exists” can only be obtained by means of experience and reasoning based on that experience.

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.11.5

“All things being equal, common principles enjoy a certain superiority over proper principles; this does not mean, however, that proper principles must be demonstrated from common principles.  The terms of the former also are joined without need of a third term and their evidence comes from proper considerations.  Yet common principles are said to be more certain than proper principles because of their greater simplicity.  Again, common principles would not be the most common if they were not included in the proper, and the proper are not such because they are totally different from the common, but rather because they imply an addition to the common.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §11.  FIRST PRINCIPLES  //  [paragraph] 5  //   [page] 34)

 

Obiter Dicta:  In order to obtain more information about priniciples so as to help myself more clearly understand what Fr. Wallace wrote above, I investigated some online sources.  One, encyclopedia.com provided me an article entitled “First Principles” ( https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/first-principles ).  Interestingly, this article in encyclopedia.com had the exact same, word for word, text as is found in the quote included immediately above from Wallace’s book.

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.11.4

“From this it can be gathered that common principles or axioms go beyond the limits of a particular science, that the truth they convey has a common value for all science.  They are also common in the sense that they express thoughts or opinions that all accept and share.  Their terms are so simple and current, their evidence so compelling, that no one can be mistaken about them.  An example is the principle of contradiction:  the same predicate cannot be affirmed, and at the same time denied, of the same subject.  Other examples are the dictum de omni and dictum de nullo already referred to [§5.7].”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §11.  FIRST PRINCIPLES  //  [paragraph] 4  //   [page] 34)

 

Obiter Dicta:  The principle of contradiction is also sometimes called the principle of non-contradiction.  An example of this principle would be the two statements about an individual whose name is Charlie; “Charlie is female” and “Charlie is not female”.  In the first, the predicate “female” is affirmed to the subject “Charlie”.  In the second, the predicate “female” is denied of the subject “Charlie”.  It is self-evident that both statements cannot be correct.  That both cannot be correct, is an example supporting the assertion that a predicate cannot both be affirmed and denied of the same subject.  This principle cannot be proven.  It can be asserted to be self-evidently correct; the obviousness of which is supported by examples such as the Charlie-example above.

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.11.3

“While a definition as such is not yet a proposition, any proposition that directly applies a definition to the thing defined is an immediate proposition.  Proper principles are always immediate, with the immediacy, so to speak, of definitions.  Their designation as “proper principles” arises from the fact that their definitions derive from the proper subject matter of a particular science.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §11.  FIRST PRINCIPLES  //  [paragraph] 3  //   [pages] 33 and 34)

 

Obiter Dicta:  The education of my early years had familiarized me with the word “immediate”.  I took this word to refer to something which happened quickly.  Later, when studying philosophy as an adult, I came across the somewhat frequent use of the word “mediate”.  I learned that the word “mediate” referred to some step or procedure or arbitration between individuals, groups, or steps of action.  That is, direct contact between two entities or the unhindered action of some process was conditioned or initially interrupted or slowed-down-for-a-hoped-for-later-improvement-in-action/effect by the use of some third party or third party function; a type of mediation.  Once I had this understanding of “mediate” in my mind, it then became clear to me that the reason some event or interaction was referred to as immediate was because of the absence of some intervening step or process or individual.

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.10.2

“First Principles (5:937) are truths on which scientific reasoning is based and to which the intellect gives direct assent; they are called “first” because they are immediately known as indemonstrable truths and because demonstrations are built upon them as premises.  They are also known as immediate propositions in the sense that, in them, the predicate affirmed between them admits of no middle term.  There are two types of first principles, viz, proper principles and common principles; these may be equivalently distinguished as definitions and axioms.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §11.  FIRST PRINCIPLES  //  [paragraph] 2  //   [page] 33)

 

Obiter Dicta:  Much of what we know depends on the acceptance of indemonstrable principles.  These principles are not able to be proven.  They seem to the open minded individual to be self-evidently true.  For example, modern science requires the acceptance of an indemonstrable principle called objectivism.  A website of the physics department of Southern Methodist University defines this principle of objectivism in the following way: “There is an objective reality which is the same for everyone.  There exist unchanging laws by which the universe works, and these laws can be discovered (not invented) through experimentation.  This point of view is called objectivism. This is a matter of belief; we can’t prove it to you. But we can justify it. The rules above lead to progress. They put people on the Moon and robots on Mars and Titan; they predict solar eclipses centuries in advance; they cure diseases like smallpox and polio; they give you light at the flick of a switch and more computing power in your hand than in all of 12th century Europe.”

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.11.1

“The foregoing exposition of universals, predicables, categories, and kinds of distinctions all relate to the first act of the mind; the apprehension of first principles, on the other hand, relates to the second act of mind when seen from the viewpoint of material logic.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §11.  FIRST PRINCIPLES  //  [paragraph] 1  //   [page] 33)

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.10.8

“In the distinction of reason reasoned about, which is also called the virtual distinction, there is a difference of objective contents taken intrinsically as such.  Its mental foundation is the mind’s passage from potency to act through a series of concepts such that not all the features revealed in one objective concept are revealed in the other.  For example, in the Prophyrian Tree, for Socrates the predicates “body,” “living,” “animal,” and “man” are all distinct from each other and from Socrates—whom they, in fact are—by a distinction of reason reasoned about.  Because they all indeed are Socrates in point of fact, there is no real distinction between them.  On the other hand they each designate different metaphysical grades of the same being and thus they each have different objective contents or different intrinsic intelligibilies [sic].  (For the Scotistic formal distinction, see 4:910d-911d.)”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §10.  KINDS OF DISTINCTION  //  [paragraph] 8  //   [page] 33)

 

Obiter Dicta:  I added the condition indication “[sic]” to the word “intelligibilies”.  I added the [sic] because I believe the more correct spelling would be “intelligibilities”.  This may more indicate a lack on the part of my knowledge than a mistake on the part of the author.

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.10.7

“The foundation of the distinction of reason reasoning is extrinsic to the thing being distinguished.  For example, there is a distinction of reason reasoning between the object that is subject and the object that is predicate in either of the following two propositions, “Man is man,” and “Man is a rational animal.”  In the first case the intellect sees the object “man” as subject to be extrinsically affected by the rational condition of being subject, and sees the same object as predicate to be extrinsically affected by the rational condition of being a predicate.  The same situation holds in the second case, except that there the predicate is the definition of the subject;  in neither case, however, is there any intrinsic difference in intelligibility between the subject and the predicate.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §10.  KINDS OF DISTINCTION  //  [paragraph] 7  //   [pages] 32 and 33)

 

Obiter Dicta:  I have found it interesting to learn, and to take note of, that the act of predication (assigning a subject to a given predicate/category) is also the act of definition.  In the statement “Man is a rational animal”, “man” is the subject, and at one and the same time “rational animal” is the predicate of the subject “man”, is the category to which the subject of “man” is assigned, and is the definition of the word “man”.

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.