The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.10.6

“The rational distinction, or distinction of reason, is of two sorts:  the less (or minor) of the two is titled the distinction of reason reasoning (rationis ratiocinantis), because it originates exclusively in the mind that understands or reasons; hence it is called also the distinction of reason without a foundation in reality (sine fundamento in re).  The greater (or major) is titled the distinction of reason reasoned about (rationis ratiocinatae), because it has a double foundation, viz, in the reasoning mind and in the thing affording rational analysis (cum fundamento in re).”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §10.  KINDS OF DISTINCTION  //  [paragraph] 6  //   [page] 32)

 

Obiter Dicta:  Just yesterday I was watching/listening to a presentation at this year’s meeting of the bishops of the United States in Baltimore, Maryland.  The presentation was by Bishop Robert Barron.  As a seminarian in Washington, D.C. he had studied philosophy as a Basselin fellow at The Catholic University of America.  The Bishop was doing a presentation on the five things his committee felt were necessary in order to attract teenagers and young adults back to Church participation and Roman Catholic practice.  One of the five items which he presented, stated that we catechists and preachers and teachers of the Church need to no longer “dumb down” the teachings and doctrines of the Church into the current form of “Catholic light (easy)”.

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.10.5

“The separation of two objects is a sufficient but not a necessary sign that a real distinction obtains between them.  An object may be a principle rather than a thing.  Real principles such as primary matter and substantial form are really distinct from each other [§16.7]; at the same time, being incomplete substances, neither can exist apart from the other.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §10.  KINDS OF DISTINCTION  //  [paragraph] 5  //   [page] 32)

 

Obiter Dicta: Primary matter does not refer to what we refer to as “matter” in the context of modern science.  Primary matter is an immaterial-stuff which makes change possible.  Another way to say the same thing is that primary matter is the immaterial-stuff which permits the change of a thing from one form into another form; which underlies the change of a thing from one form to another.  Consider the thing called an acorn.  Under normal circumstances, the acorn can become an oak tree.  Acorn is one type of substantial form.  Oak tree is another type of substantial form.  The thing which is an acorn ceases to exist and then becomes an oak tree.  However, for the acorn to change into the oak tree, something must continually exist for that change to occur.  This something which continually exists is primary matter.  It is primary matter which takes on the varying and changing substantial forms which come to exist through change.  If this primary matter did not exist, change could never happen.  If there were no primary matter, once the acorn ceases to exist, there is nothing at all; and since only nothing can follow from nothing, an oak tree would never come into existence.  Thus, scholastic and classical metaphysics holds that each and every thing must consist of primary form which is capable of becoming/sustaining/supporting a variety of changing substantial forms.

A thing is composed of both its primary matter and substantial form.  The acorn consists of this immaterial-stuff of primary matter taking on the substantial form of the acorn.  Without the primary matter, there is no acorn.  Without the substantial form of acorn, the primary matter (which is pure potency; that is, can only exist in an actual way once impressed with a particular substantial form) does not exist.  This is my understanding of the assertion Father Wallace that though both of these principles (i.e. primary matter and substantial form) are real things, they cannot exist separate from one another.

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.10.4

“The real distinction may be either absolute, as in the three ways just enumerated, or modal.  A modal distinction holds either (1) between a thing and its mode [34.6] of being or acting, e.g. between Socrates and his being seated, or (2) between two modes of the same thing, e.g., between Socrates’ being seated and his being in prison.  It is generally held that the distinction between a continuum and its actual indivisibles (64.6] is a modal distinction; analogously the distinction drawn in metaphysics between an essence and its act of subsistence is also modal [§34.4].”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §10.  KINDS OF DISTINCTION  //  [paragraph] 4  //   [page] 32)

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.10.3

“Objects distinct according to a real distinction are non-identical things in their own right, prior to and independent of any objectifying insight by the human reason.  Thus two individuals of the same species, while not at all formally distinct, are distinct from each other by a real, absolute, material or numerical distinction.  They are diverse as beings, though altogether alike in essential form.  If the two individuals differ also in species, then they are distinct by a real, absolute distinction that is both material and formal; they are diverse and different.  If one abstracts from the individuals as such and considers their essences either as natures in themselves or as so-called “metaphysical universals,” then these essences are distinct from each other by a real, absolute, formal distinction.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §10.  KINDS OF DISTINCTION  //  [paragraph] 3  //   [page] 31)

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.10.2

“A distinction may be either formal or material, i.e., numerical; the former indicates a difference of species or form, a difference properly so called, and the latter, a difference in number i.e., a diversity.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §10.  KINDS OF DISTINCTION  //  [paragraph] 2  //   [page] 31)

 

Obiter Dicta:  An example of the formal distinction stated above may be like the difference between a human being and a non-human animal such as a dog, or between a human being and a porpoise, or between a human being and a plant.  Such a distinction might be called numerical in the sense that the one (e.g. human being) is of one kind and the other (e.g. porpoise) is of another kind.

An example of the material distinction stated above might be the difference between the human being named Robert and the human being named Mary, or between two pet dogs.  In such a case the difference would be by-number, as in, one human being and a second human being.

The understanding just presented be means of examples of the difference between formal and material distinctions might be correct.  Or, perhaps, the examples given may only have an analogical similarity.  Or, the examples and understanding might not be correct.

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.10.1

“The predicables and the categories furnish valuable tools of definition.  They also give rise to problems of distinction, however, because not all of the predicates that can be assigned to a given subject are really distinct one from the other—some distinctions originate as a result of the mind’s operation alone.  To clarify the relationships between various predicates or universals a rather extensive teaching on the kinds of distinction (4:908d) has developed; this will now be summarized for the additional insight it provides as to the nature of universals and the relationship that obtain between them.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §10.  KINDS OF DISTINCTION  //  [paragraph] 1  //   [page] 31)

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.9.10

“Location (8:948d) in place [§19.2] provides the basis for another category, the accident “where” (ubi).  This inheres in a subject through its quantity, because of the circumscriptive containment of the subject arising from the surrounding quantities of other bodies.  Situation (13:268b) or situs is an accident supposing the category “where,” which it further determines by specifying the order of parts of the body in place.  Posture or position would thus be synonyms for situation.  Vestition or habitus, also called possession or condition (1:76d), is the accident proper to a body by reason of something extrinsic and adjacent to it that does not measure it, as does place.  An example would be “clothed,” whereby a body is denominated by something extrinsic to it, viz, clothing.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §9. CATEGORIES  //  [paragraph] 10  //   [pages] 30 and 31)

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.

The Elements of Philosophy: 1.2.9.9

“Time (14:155d), or more properly the accident of “when” (quando), confers on corporeal substances that exist in the changing world of time a type of accidental existence by reason of their temporal situation.  “When” is therefore a category of real being; it has extrinsic denomination from time [§19.4] as its measure.”  (PART 1.  //  CHAPTER 2 LOGIC.  //  [Section] MATERIAL LOGIC §9. CATEGORIES  //  [paragraph] 9  //   [page] 30)

 

Obiter Dicta:  In his An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, Cardinal John Henry Newman (A.D. 1801 to 1890) wrote, “In a higher world it is otherwise, but here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often.” (chapter 1, section 1, part 7).  Change is a necessary part of our contingent world and existence.  Because there is change, things are one way and then they are another way and then another way; e.g. the acorn becomes an oak tree, the cold rain become frozen on wires, the child becomes an adult.  One can then refer to a condition or these states as “when”; e.g. “when I was a child”, “when I became an adult”, etc.

We today, often think of time, understand time, perceive time to be an actual condition of our existence and lives.  Like the atmosphere within which we exist, like the gravity that causes us to fall, the world in which we live, we think of time as an actual condition within which we live.  In short, we think and understand that time would continue to exist even if there were no sentient beings which perceived time.  We think of time as a thing which has its own existence.

Time may be an actual thing, the nature of which is much as we perceive it in ordinary everyday reality.  Or time may be a reality in a different sense.  One such differing concept involves measuring change in terms of the passage of a photon of light along a very small (i.e. sub-sub-atomic) length, referred to as planck length; the measure of the passage of that photon being referred to as planck time; a scale shorter than which has no meaning.   But it is also possible that time does not exist at all.  Or, it is possible that time is an actual construct of our mind only which allows us a context within which to understand change within the world.

One might object to such differing concepts of time by saying that the ordinary experience of time seems so real that this experience of time must be the real thing.  Well, look at some wall in the room in which you are now sitting.  Walk up to that wall.  Touch that wall. Lean against that wall.  Push against that wall.  Feel how it does not move despite your effort to move it.  This causes us to think of that wall as a continuous physical thing.  And yet, our science has proved that that wall, and all walls like it, are not solid things but rather a complex interlapping and intermeshing of forces and fields which exist at the subatomic level.  When I push against the wall with my hand or I lean against that wall for support, its intermeshed and interlapping field of forces oppose the same type of interlapped and intermeshed forces and fields in my hand or body.  And yet, to the evolutionary development of how our senses take in the world in which we live and move, that wall seems like a solid thing.

Another similar assault to our evolutionary developed sense perception of the reality surrounding us involves color; such as the red/orange color of maple tree leaves in the fall, the green color of the planet Uranus, the colors of a flag.  Outside of and independent of our eyes, such colors do not exist.  What exists in reality are various wavelengths of light.  Once these photons of varying wavelengths enter our eyes, the process begins by which the energies of these photons are changed into chemical and electrical reactions at the retina of the eye and in the optic nerve cord and finally within the synaptic circuitry of the brain itself.  It is here that the perceptions and concepts of various colors appear.

In a similar way, we cannot be sure if time exists or what its exact nature is.  Nor are we certain of just how our senses and mind and speech interact with and handle time.  For example, it seems that most forms of human speech are tensed; that is, they have verb conjugations providing terms which distinguish between past and present and future.  And yet, we must ask if our tensed speech, instead of allowing us to perceive and display the world as it is, is a tool of our evolutionary development which provides us a context to function within a world/universe/creation which is as timeless as the wall of which we spoke above is not solid and as colorless as the red/orange leaves of autumn.

Regardless; however, of the uncertainty and confusion we have about the reality of time, we can be certain that change is real.  And the reality of change allows for the distinguishing category of “when”.

 

Key:  For an explanation of the reference and cross reference forms used in this book (e.g. [§19.6] and (11:292c), see previous posts in this blog entitled “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (7)” and “The Elements of Philosophy:  Preface (8)”.